GLOBAL TRENDS 2040 EMERGING DYNAMICS: STATES: TENSIONS, TURBULENCE, AND TRANSFORMATION

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3. Photo / Bigstock 78 STATE: TENSIONS, TURBULENCE, AND TRANSFORMATION Key Takeaways Governments in all regions will face mounting pressures f rom economic constraints and a mix of demographic, environmental, and other challenges. Meanwhile, populations will demand more, and they are empowered to push for their conflicting goals and priorities. The relationships between societies and their governments are likely to face persistent tensions because of a growing mismatch between what publics expect and what governments deliver. This widening gap portends more political volatility, risks for democracy, and expanding roles for alternative sources of governance. Growing public discontent, if accompanied by a catalyzing crisis and inspired leadership, could spur significant shifts or transformations in how people govern. EMERGING DYNAMICS

2. MOTIVACIÓN A LA LECTURA El pasado mes de marzo se publicó l a 7ª edición del informe tendencias globales del Consejo Nacional de Inteligencia de EE.UU. , con una mirada hacia el año 2040. Global Trends se publica cada cuatro años desde 1997 y evalúa las tendencias e incertidumbres clave s que darán forma al entorno estratégico para los Estados Unidos durante las próximas dos décadas , mismo entorno que rodea y concierne , entre otros, a los que elaboran la estrategia de seguridad nacional de nuestros países , contribuyendo a prepararse para una serie de posibles porvenires . Si bien es cierto , que el futuro invariablemente puede ser alterado y que el presente trabajo es especulativo , este se basa en fundamentos analítico s , construi d os con argumentos que se apoyan en datos y tendencias , por lo que vale la pena al menos considerarlo . En términos generales, el propósito de esta lectura es despertar el interés por el análisis de las tendencias que incluye el informe y sus efectos en los distintos niveles , mientras que en términos específicos se bu sca dar a conocer la aprecia ción referente a tensiones, turbulencias y conflictos internos a los cuales se vería n enfrentados los estados, situación de la cual ya tuvimos una muestra en Sudamérica durante el año 2019 y que , de acuerdo a este informe , se podría n presentar con mayor frecuencia e intensidad en distintos lugares del mundo , afectando evidentemente a la seguridad nacional . El análisis comienza con una descripción de las crecientes diferencias entre las expectati vas de la población y la capacidad de los gobiernos ; el incremento de la inestabilidad política, de la mano del populismo y la polarización; el debilitamiento de los sistemas de gobierno, incluyendo a la democracia y a los regímenes autoritarios; ad aptabilidad e innovación para gobernar; y, finalmente, la creación o cambio de modelos. La motivación es sin duda mayor, ya que, al analizar estas tendencias y sus causas, se puede contribuir a generar una estrategia que permita mitigar y enfrentar los aspectos negativos que se describen, colaborar a generar los cambios necesarios antes de que se generen focos de conflicto mayores y toma r acciones que permitan crear mayor legitimidad, credibilidad y a su vez estabilidad para el futuro de nuestros países . La lectura puesta en su consideración se la puede encontrar en: Office of the Director of National Intelligence - Global Trends (dni.gov)

4. Photo / Bigstock PUBLIC DEMANDS GOVERNMENT CAPABILITIES P O L I T I C A L V O L A T I L I T Y POLARIZATION DEMOCRACY AT RISK ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE RIPE FOR NEW OR SHIFTING MODELS? POPULISM STATE COLLAPSE E X T R E M E PROTESTS INTERNAL CONFLICT DISEQUILIBRIUM • Additional nonstate providers of governance • Complement and compete with the state • Local governance more consequential • Disequilibrium could spur shifts or transformations in how people govern • Governments strained by limited resources and compounding pressures from: — Demographics — Environment — Technology — Economics • Demanding more from governments • More potent public voice • Democratic governance eroding • Authoritarian regimes vulnerable as well A MORE CONTESTED WORLD 79

13. Image / Bigstock Bangkok, Thailand accounts for almost half of the country’s economic output. allPhoto Bangkok / Pexels GLOBAL TRENDS 2040 88 Local Governance More Consequential Local governments are also likely to become increasingly important sources of governance innovation because of their ability to solve problems for their populations. Local governments generally have the advantage of proximity to the problems of their constituents, legitimacy, accountability, and the flexibility to customize responses; they also have less partisanship. Cities and subnational govern - ments have greater ability than national gov - ernments to create and lead multisectoral net - works involving various levels of government, private sector, and civil society; these partner - ships have helped to revitalize some former industrial cities in the West. Local and city governments—increasingly organized into net - works—will take action on international issues such as climate change and migration, getting ahead of national governments in some cases. As urban areas grow in population and as hubs for economic activity, technology, and innovation, these local governments are likely to gain increasing clout vis-a-vis national gov - ernments. Even in authoritarian regimes, local governance is likely to be a locus for problem solving, but with different constraints. Like national governments, local governments are likely to face budgetary constraints, par - ticularly after the COVID-19 crisis. Cities in the developing world are likely to face significant financing gaps for infrastructure development and climate change adaptation. In addition, urbanization is likely to exacerbate urban-ru - ral societal divides, while the expanding role for local and city governance may undermine policy coherence when local and national strategies for problem solving diverge.

9. 1980s and 1990s, a mix of factors has led to democratic stagnation or backsliding, includ - ing weak state capacity, tenuous rule of law, fragile traditions of tolerance for opposition, high inequality, corruption, and militaries with a strong role in politics. Externally, China, Russia and other actors, in varying ways, are undermining democracies and supporting illiberal regimes. This support includes sharing technology and expertise for digital repres - sion. In particular, some foreign actors are attempting to undermine public trust in elec - tions, threatening the viability of democratic systems. Both internal and external actors are increasingly manipulating digital information and spreading disinformation to shape public views and achieve political objectives. Looking forward, many democracies are likely to be vulnerable to further erosion and even collapse. An academic study of 75 democra - cies that experienced substantial democratic decline since 1994 found that 60 of them (or 80 percent) eventually became autocracies. However, the decline is not inexorable, and it may ultimately reflect a bad patch in a long cycle that has seen democracy advance and retreat, with an overarching trend to more democracy during the past century. The long- term legitimacy of democratic systems hinges on two general conditions: maintaining a fair, inclusive, and equitable political process and delivering positive outcomes for populations. Addressing public concerns about corruption, elite capture, and inequality can help restore public trust and strengthen institutional legiti - GLOBAL TRENDS 2040 84 World average World average (population weighted) DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE DECLINING GLOBALLY The wave of democratization that surged around the world after the end of the Cold War has crested, and aggregate global levels of democracy have begun to decline in recent years. Source: Varieties of Democracy’s Liberal Democracy Index measures electoral freedoms, civil liberties, rule of law, and constraints on the executive branch. LIBERAL DEMOCRACY INDEX 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 20 15 10 05 2000 95 90 85 1980

5. W hile populations are exercising more potent public voices, governments will experience mounting pressure from economic constraints and a mix of demographic, environmental, and other challenges. GLOBAL TRENDS 2040 80 GROWING MISMATCH BETWEEN PUBLIC DEMANDS AND GOVERNMENT CAPABILITIES Over the next two decades, the relationships between states and their societies in every region are likely to face persistent tensions because of a growing mismatch between what publics need or expect and what governments can or are willing to deliver. In many countries, populations with expectations heightened by previous prosperity are likely to face greater strains and disruptions from slowing eco - nomic growth, uncertain job opportunities, and changing demographics. These popula - tions also will be better equipped to advocate for their interests after decades of steady improvements in education and access to communication technologies as well as the greater coherence of like-minded groups. Although trust in government institutions is low among the mass public, people are likely to continue to view the state as ultimately responsible for addressing their challenges, and to demand more from their governments to deliver solutions. While populations are exercising more potent public voices, governments will experience mounting pressure from economic constraints and a mix of demographic, environmental, and other challenges. Individually and collec - tively, these pressures will test states’ capacity and resilience, deplete budgets, and add to the complexity of governing. Demographics and Human Development. Many countries will struggle to build on or even sustain the human development suc - cesses achieved in the past several decades because of setbacks from the ongoing global pandemic, slower global economic growth, the effects of conflict and climate, and more difficult steps required to meet higher de - velopment goals. Meanwhile, countries with aging populations and those with youthful and growing populations will each face unique sets of challenges associated with those demo - graphics. Migration is likely to increase the salience of identity issues that divide societies in receiving countries and may fuel ethnic con - flicts. Rapid urbanization—occurring mostly in Africa and Asia—will stress governments’ abili - ty to provide adequate infrastructure, security, and resources for these growing cities. Responding to Climate Change and Environ - mental Degradation will strain governments in every region. The impact will be partic - ularly acute in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, where governments are already weak, stressed, or fragile. Wealthy countries will also increasingly face environmental costs and even disasters that challenge governments’ responsiveness and resources, potentially undermining public trust. Economic Constraints. The expected trend of slowing economic growth is likely to strain the resources and capacity of governments to provide services. Governments are already saddled with debt on an unprecedented scale. In addition, rising or persistent inequality within many states, coupled with corruption, will threaten people’s faith in government and trust in one another.

14. Image / Bigstock A MORE CONTESTED WORLD 89 RIPE FOR NEW OR SHIFTING MODELS? The combination of widespread public discon - tent and major crises or shocks could create conditions that are ripe for significant shifts or transformations in the models, ideologies, or ways of governing. Historically, ideologi - cal shifts across regions have taken place at moments of catastrophic crisis, such as in the wake of a major war or economic collapse, because people are more willing to embrace bold systemic changes to address overarching problems. However, the emergence of a new unifying ideology or system—on the scale of communism or economic liberalism—is rare. Other stresses, such as another pandemic or a major environmental catastrophe, that ex - pose governance shortcomings might create conditions ripe for new or alternative models to gain traction if widespread dysfunction is sustained. Pervasive discontent and major crises proba - bly are necessary forcing functions for trans - formations but not sufficient. Transforming discontent into something new also requires the combination of inspiring and unifying leadership with compelling ideas or ideology to build political coalitions and garner socie - tal consensus. Short of a new ideology, new approaches—or even more combinations or blends of systems—could occur along several axes, from centralized to localized governance, from a strong state role to a strong nonstate role, from democratic to authoritarian, from secular to religious, or from nationalist to in - ternationalist. These shifts or transformations would spur inevitable contestation between the constituencies holding onto the old orders and those embracing the new ones. The precise nature of these shifts, transforma - tions, or new models is uncertain and difficult to foresee. Some potential outcomes include: cities or subnational regions emerging as the focal point for governance if populations see local governments as more trustworthy and capable of solving problems than national governments; the private sector and other nonstate actors overtaking and displacing gov - ernments as the primary providers of welfare and security; democracy experiencing a revival if it proves more adaptive to the coming global challenges; or the world succumbing to an authoritarian wave partially inspired by Chi - na’s model of technology-driven authoritarian capitalism. Moreover, compelling new gover - nance models or ideologies that have not yet been envisioned or identified could emerge and take hold.

6. Alfarnas Solkar / Unsplash Informal settlements in Mumbai, India. Inequality in many countries will be a key challenge for governments and a source of discontent among populations. Photo / Bigstock A MORE CONTESTED WORLD 81 Technological Change. Governments will be hard pressed to keep up with the pace of tech - nological change and implement policies that harness the benefits and mitigate the risks and disruptions. Technological advances will also empower individuals and nonstate actors to challenge the role of the state in new way s. In the face of these challenges, existing sys - tems and models of go vernance are proving inadequate to meet the expectations of popu - lations. The result is a growing disequilibrium between public demands and governments’ ability to deliver economic opportunity and security. This public pessimism cuts across rightwing, leftwing, and centrist governments, demo cratic and authoritarian states, and populist and technocratic administrations. For instance, in Latin America and the Caribbean, public opinion surveys in 18 countries showed a significant decline in satisfaction with how demo cracy is performing in their countries from an average of 59 percent of respondents in 2010 to 40 percent in 2018. As publics grow skeptical of existing go vernment systems, gov - ernments and societies are likely to struggle to agree on how to adapt or transform to ad - dress key goals, including advancing economic opportunities, addressing inequalities, and reducing crime and corruption. The nature of these challenges and the gov - ernment responses will vary across regions and countries. In So uth Asia, for instanc e, some countries will face a combination of slo w economic growth that is likely to be insuffi - cient to employ their expanding workforces, the effects of severe environmental degrada - tion and climate change, and rising polariza - tion. Meanwhile European countries are likely to contend with mounting debt, low produc - tivity growth, aging and shrinking workforces, rural-urban divides, and possibly increasing inequality as well as fractured politics and debates over economic and fiscal policies at the national level and in the EU. In China, the central tension is whether the Chinese Com - munist Party can maintain control by deliv - ering a growing economy, public health, and safety, while repressing dissent. The massive middle class in China is largely quiescent now; an economic slowdown could change this. Many states are likely to remain stuck in an uneasy disequilibrium in which populations are unsatisfied with the existing system but unable to reach consensus on a path for - ward. A decade ago, the Arab Spring exposed serious shortcomings in the prevailing political orders, but in most countries in the region, a new social contract between state and soci - ety has yet to emerge. Similar to the Middle East, other regions could be headed toward a protracted and tumultuous process in part because citizens have lost faith in the ability of government institutions to solve problems.

11. have given populations the tools to circum - vent digital repression and mobilize dissent. In addition to repression, regimes will rely on cooptation to convince critical allies to stay loyal, but this dynamic depends on more ten - uous flows of resources. Many authoritarian governments will seek to build popular legit - imacy through effective government perfor - mance and compelling ideologies. With their centralized power, some authoritarian regimes have demonstrated faster and more flexible responses to emerging challenges, but histori - cally authoritarian governments have suffered from lack of innovation caused by misalloca - tion of resources. Authoritarian regimes that deliver economic opportunities and maintain security may convince their publics that their system is better suited to dealing with the complexity and speed of tomorrow’s world. ADAPTIVE APPROACHES TO GOVERNANCE: MORE ACTORS PROVIDING A WIDER RANGE OF SERVICES As public needs and expectations mount, there is likely to be a growing shift toward adaptive approaches to governance that involve a broader set of actors outside state institutions delivering welfare and security. Nonstate actors, including private sector com - panies, NGOs, civil society groups, religious organizations, and insurgent and criminal networks, have long provided governance in all types of states. These roles are likely to ex - pand to a wider range of actors and functions because of a combination of factors including: the failure of states to provide adequate gov - ernance; the increasing resources and reach of the private sector, NGOs, and individuals because of technology; and the growing com - plexity and number of public policy challenges that require multiple stakeholders to address. This shift is likely to produce some tensions and growing pains within states, as exempli - fied by illiberal regimes cracking down on civil society organizations or democracies seeking to regulate social media and operations of some nonstate actors. Depending on the context and activity, non - state actors will complement, compete with, and in some cases replace the state. The provision of governance outside state insti - tutions does not necessarily pose a threat to central governments, nor does it diminish the overall quality of governance for the popu - lation. The roles and relationships between state and nonstate actors will depend on their relative capacity, penetration, and alignment with population expectations. From the Middle East to Africa and Latin America, insurgent groups and criminal organizations are filling in the governance gap and at times exploiting weak governments to expand their influence by providing employment and social services, ranging from healthcare and education to security and trash collection. In other cases particularly in Africa, international NGOs, some religiously based, augment the role of the state by providing health and education services. During the COVID-19 pandemic, numerous examples of adaptive governance have appeared. Corporations, philanthropies, technology companies, and research and academic institutions have worked in concert with governments to produce breakthroughs at record speeds. Elsewhere, civil society or - ganizations all over the world have filled gaps in government responses, providing humani - tarian relief and welfare services. This role of nonstate actors in governance extends beyond providing services; for example, technology companies wield significant power in their control over information flows and networks with the ability to shape political discourse. GLOBAL TRENDS 2040 86

8. insufficient government responses, and perva - sive technology to organize protests rapidly. Political Violence, Internal Conflict, and State Collapse. During the next two decades, increased volatility is likely to lead to the breakdown of political order and outbreak of political violence in numerous countries, par - ticularly in the developing world. As of 2020, 1.8 billion people—or 23 percent of the world’s population—lived in fragile contexts with weak governance, security, social, environmental, and economic conditions, according to an OECD estimate. This number is projected to grow to 2.2 billion—or 26 percent of the world’s population—by 2030. These states are mostly concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa, followed by the Middle East and North Africa, Asia, and Latin America. These areas will also face an increasing combination of conditions, including climate change, food insecurity, youthful and growing populations (in Africa), and rapid urbanization, that will exacerbate state fragility. Outbreaks of political violence or internal conflict are not limited to these fragile states, however, and are likely to ap - pear even in historically more stable countries when political volatility grows severe. DEMOCRACY UNDER PRESSURE AND AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES ALSO VULNERABLE This volatile political climate creates vulner - abilities for all types of governments, from established liberal democracies to closed authoritarian systems. Adaptability and per - formance are likely to be key factors in the relative rise and fall of democratic and author - itarian governance during the next 20 years. Governments that harness new opportunities, adapt to rising pressures, manage growing social fragmentation, and deliver security and economic prosperity for their populations will preserve or strengthen their legitimacy, whereas those that fail will inspire competito rs or demands for alternative models. Demo cra - cies will also have the advantage of drawing legitimacy from the fairness and inclusivity of their political systems—attributes harder to achieve in authoritarian systems. Democracy Eroding The challenges go vernments face suggest there is a high risk that an ongoing trend in erosion of democratic governance will con - tinue during at least the next decade and perhaps longer. This trend has been wide - spread—seen in established, wealthy, liberal demo cracies as well as less mature partial demo cracies. Key democratic traits, including freedom of expressio n and the press, judicial independence, and pro tections for minori - ties, are deteriorating globally with countries sliding in the direction of greater autho ritari - anism. The democracy promo tion non-govern - mental organization (NGO) Freedom House repo rted that 20 20 was the 1 5 th consecutive year of decline in political rights and civil liber - ties. Another respected measure of democracy worldwide, Varieties of Democracy, indicates that as of 2020, 34 percent of the wo rld’s po p - ulation were living in countries where dem - ocratic governance was declining, compared with 4 percent who were living in countries that were becoming mo re democratic. Several internal and external forces are driving this democratic erosion. In some Western demo cracies, public distrust of the capabil - ities and policies of established parties and elites, as well as anxieties about economic dislocations, status reversals, and immigra - tion, have fueled the rise of illiberal leaders who are undermining democratic norms and institutions and civil liberties. In newer democ - racies—mostly in the developing world—that transitioned from autho ritarian rule in the A MORE CONTESTED WORLD 83

10. macy. In addition, providing effective services, economic stability, and personal security— historically advantages for democracies—in - creases public satisfaction. Beyond these basic governance benchmarks, demonstrating resil - ience to emerging global challenges will help restore and maintain public confidence. Over the long term, the advance or retreat of democracy will depend in part on the rela - tive power balance among major powers. Geopolitical competition, including efforts to influence or support political outcomes in other countries, relative success in delivering economic growth and public goods, and the extent of ideological contest between the Western democratic model and China’s tech - no-authoritarian system, will shape democrat - ic trends around the world. Authoritarian Regimes Will Face Vulnerabilities Authoritarian regimes will face many of the same risks as democracies and many may be less adaptable, making a sudden, violent change of government after a period of ap - parent stability more likely. Although authori - tarian regimes in countries from China to the Middle East have demonstrated staying power, they have sig - nificant structural weaknesses, including widespread corruption, overreliance on commodities, and highly personalist leader - ship. Public protests are posing increasing threats to authoritari - an regimes, toppling 10 regimes between 2010 and 2017; another 19 regimes were removed in elections, often held in response to mass protests. Corruption was a primary motivation behind many protests, and authoritar - ian regimes tend to be more corrupt than democracies. Authoritarian regimes that rely on raw commodities to finance their patron - age networks and fuel their economies will be vulnerable to fluctuations in commodity prices, especially if energy transitions depress oil prices. Personalist authoritarian regimes— in which power is consolidated in one person or a small group—tend to be the most corrupt and erratic in decisionmaking, the least likely to plan for succession, and the most likely to start wars and escalate conflicts. Today the most common form of authoritarian regime is personalist—rising from 23 percent of dicta - torships in 1988 to 40 percent in 2016—and other regimes, including in China and Saudi Arabia, are moving in that direction. To try to quell, withstand, or address public discontent, authoritarian regimes are using new and traditional forms of coercion, coopta - tion, and legitimation. Technology has helped make authoritarian regimes more durable in recent years, in part because digitization and communication technologies make surveil - lance more pervasive and less costly. The flip side of these technological trends is that they Ugandan officials operating a facial recognition surveillance system provided by a Chinese company. (@KagutaMuseveni / Twitter) A MORE CONTESTED WORLD 85

12. 2010 2020 GOVERNMENT USE OF DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY Governments in almost every region increased the scope and quality of online governance services between 2010-2020, according to UN data. 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 Sub-Saharan Africa Asia Pacific Middle East & North Africa South & Central Asia Latin America & Caribbean Eastern Europe Western Europe North America INNOVATION IN GOVERNANCE States and nonstate actors will look for ways to adapt to mounting governance challenges, experimenting with novel tools and techniques for providing security and welfare that could in turn be adopted around the world. Although trends in governance innovation are difficult to discern or forecast, one clear area of innovation will be in the development and application of technologies to improve the speed, efficiency, and precision of governance. • Governments worldwide have increased their use of technology for service provision and citizen engagement during the past two decades. While the most proficient countries for digital governance are largely high-income countries, the general trend in digital governance extends across all countries and regions. • The increasing availability of data about all aspects of people’s lives—coupled with the artificial intelligence (AI) technology to analyze it—is making governments more agile in directing services and providing security. This is a double-edged sword: the same AI-enabled surveillance technology that allows governments to diminish crime also enables them to monitor and repress their populations . • Given the roles of public and private sectors in technology development and application, key innovations are likely to involve both state and nonstate actors. For instance, the advent of mobile payments and banking systems in Africa has allowed governments to implement cash transfers and pay employees more efficiently and reliably. • Once established, innovative governance approaches are likely to spread around the world. For example, AI-enabled surveillance technology has proliferated around the globe—adopted by at least 74 countries as of 2018—and is provided by both Chinese and Western companies. Likewise, successful models gain adherents quickly: at least 40 countries have implemented conditional cash transfer programs as a development tool, inspired in part by the success of Brazil’s Bolsa Familia program in the 2000’s in reducing poverty. UN Online Services Index Frederic Köberl / Unsplash A MORE CONTESTED WORLD 87

7. Even if states impro ve security and welfare in the aggregate, these gains and opportunities may be unevenly distributed, fueling discon - tent in seemingly more prosperous soc ieties. For instance, from 2000-2018, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries experienced overall growth in employment, but jobs were divided be - tween high and low wages with little in the middle, many jobs became increasingly tenu - ous, and job growth varied significantly across regions and demographic groups. POLITICAL V OLATILITY RIS ING In coming years, this mismatch between go v - ernments’ abilities and publics’ expectations is likely to expand and lead to more political volatility, including growing polarizatio n and populism within po litical systems, waves of activism and protest movements, and, in the most extreme cases, violence, internal con - flict, or even state collapse. Variations in state capacity, ideology, and prior histories with mobilization will shape how and when public discontent translates into political volatility in each country. Polarization and Populism. Polarization along ethnic, religious, and ideological lines is likely to remain strong, as political leaders and well-organized groups push a wide variety of broad goals and approaches that cut across economic, governance, social, identity, and international issues. In some countries, such polarization is likely to increase and reinforce political dysfunction and gridlock and heighten risks of political instability. Once established, severe polarization is difficult to reverse. Pub - lic dissatisfaction with mainstream politics for failing to address economic or social grievanc - es has also led to the global rise in populism during the past several decades—measured in both the number of populist leaders in power and populist party vote shares worldwide. Although some populists will falter in office, the populist appeal is likely to endure as long as dissatisfaction, polarization, and fractured information landscapes persist. In addition, populism tends to surge after economic crises or changes in the ethnic or religious composi - tion of a society from migration. Protests. Anti-government protests have increased globally since 2010, affecting every regime and government type. Although pro - tests are a signal of political turbulence, they can also be a sign of democratic health and a force for democratization by pressing for ac - countability and political change. The protest phenomenon is likely to persist in cycles and waves because of the enduring nature of the underlying drivers, including ongoing public dissatisfaction and desire for systemic change, GLOBAL TRENDS 2040 82 Protests—seen here in Algeria—have surged worldwide in the past decade, reflecting public dissatisfaction on a range of topics including inequalities, political repression, corruption, and climate change. Amine M'Siouri / Pexels

1. ARMADA DEL ECUADOR ACADEMIA DE GUERRA NAVAL Guayaquil - o - Descargo : Las opiniones expresadas en este documento son de exclusiva responsabilidad de sus autores y no necesariamente representan la opinión de la Academia de Guerra Naval o de la Armada del Ecuador. LECTURA RECOMENDADA GLOBAL TRENDS 2040 EMERGING DY NAMICS: STATES : TENSIONS, TURBULENCE, AND T RANSFORMATION U . S . NATIONAL I NTELLIGENCE COUNCIL Lectura recomendada por : CPFG - EM Felipe Gorigoitía Ortiz Asesor Armada de Chile en la Academia de Guerra Naval 2 02 1

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